In the Sachar Committee Report, a report from 2006 about the socio-economic status of Muslims in India, it was stated that a number of constituencies (electoral districts) reserved for Scheduled Castes (SCs) have a high proportion of Muslims and a low proportion of SCs, while there are many general (unreserved) constituencies with fewer Muslims and more SCs. Some have interpreted this as an allegation that the Delimitation Commission in the 1970s willfully assigned constituencies reserved for SCs to areas with a high Muslim population. Since this Delimitation was in force for more than 30 years , this could have seriously undermined the representation of Muslims in India. In this paper I use archival evidence from the Election Commission records as well as unique statistical data of the Muslim population across Indian constituencies in the 1970s to show that there is no evidence that such a systematic discrimination took place. Looking at data from 14 Indian states, I show that the Muslim population is on average lower in reserved constituencies than in general ones. This is mainly due to the fact that reserved seats by construction have a high concentration of SCs, and therefore a lower concentration of other groups. On comparing reserved and general constituencies with similar proportions of SCs, I find that there is no statistically significant difference in the proportion of Muslims in reserved and general areas. These results do not suggest that Muslims have been adequately represented in Indian politics, but simply that it is unfounded allegation that Muslims have been over-represented in reserved constituencies.
Introduction
In the Sachar Committee Report, a report from 2006 about the socio-economic status of Muslims in India, it was stated that a number of constituencies (electoral districts) reserved for Scheduled Castes (SCs) have a high proportion of Muslims and a low proportion of SCs, while there are many general (unreserved) constituencies with fewer Muslims and more SCs. 
Muslim representation in India
The concern about the under-represented of Muslims in Indian politics is not a new issue. In
October 1906, after discussions had started about allowing Indians to elect representatives to the legislative councils across the country, a delegation of Muslims visited Lord Minto, the Viceroy of India, in his summer residence in Shimla to demand political safeguards. In an address read by Sir Aga Khan III, they argued that Muslims would remain a minority in a plurality electoral system, and that Muslims must be ensured communal representation. In his response to the address, Minto stated that: "the Mahommedan community may rest assured that their political rights and interests as a community will be safeguarded by any administrative re-organization with which I am concerned" (quoted in Minto 1934, p. 47 ).
Minto kept his promise. In the Indian Council Act of 1909 several communities, including
Muslims, landholders and different commercial interests, were ensured the right to elect community representatives to the Legislative Councils in British India (Ilbert 1910, pp. 432-35) .
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Ten years later, the Montagu-Chelmsford report (1918, p. 149 ) strongly discouraged a continuation of the communal representation, but conceded that it would be politically difficult to remove the provisions that were in place:
"The Muhammedans regard these as settled facts, and any attempt to go back on them will rouse a storm of bitter protest and put a severe strain on the loyalty of a community which has behaved with conspicuous loyalty during a period of very great difficulty […] How can we say to them that we regard the decision of 1909 as mistaken, that its retention is incompatible with progress towards responsible government, that its reversal will eventually be to their benefit; and that for these reasons we have decided to go back on it?"
As a result, political reservations for Muslims, and other groups, became a part of the Government of India Acts of 1909 Acts of , 1919 Acts of , 1935 and the first draft of the Indian constitution.
However, seeing the violent effects of communal conflict at the time of Partition made many of the representatives in India's Constituent Assembly change their minds. In spring 1949, the Advisory Committee on Minorities and Fundamental Rights passed a resolution to abolish reservations for religious minorities. Sardar Patel, the chairman of the Committee, explained in a letter to the President of the Constituent Assembly that the resolution was motivated conditions in the country having "vastly changed since August 1947" and that "it was no longer appropriate in the context of free India and of present conditions that there should be reservation of seats for Muslims, Christians, Sikhs or any other religious community" (CAD 1950 (CAD /1999 . The resolution was supported by several of the Muslim representatives in the Constituent
Assembly. For example, Begam Aizaz Rasul stated that "reservation is a self-destructive weapon which separates the minorities from the majority for all time" (CAD, 1950 (CAD, /1999 . 
The Sachar Committee Report
In recent elections, the demand for reservations for Muslims in educational institutions, governmental jobs and in politics has been used as a campaign strategy by several political 6In ongoing work, Raphael Susewind (2013, forthcoming) has also developed name recognition software that is able to identify the religious community of MLAs. This software relies both on name recognition from name databases and recognition of common combinations of letters, and will therefore probably be able to categorize names better than existing softwares. Some of those commenting on the report have denounced the evidence in the report and called it a political gimmick meant to set the stage for a political demand for reservations for Muslims, but a lack of easily available data has made it hard to provide consistent counter-evidence. Report.
The conclusion in the Sachar Committe report about Muslims being over-represented in reserved constituencies was based on weak evidence. In Chapter 2 of the report it is noted that in talking to Muslims across Indian states the "[a]ttention of the Committee was drawn to the issue of Muslim concentration assembly constituencies being declared as 'reserved' constituencies 7The claim has been discussed by, among others, Basant (2007) , Kalam (2007) , Alam (2008) , Ahmed (2008) and Yadav (2008 The data that was collated by the Committee was appended to the report, and the data provided for UP has been reproduced in Figure 1 . Looking at the data in Figure 1 , the conclusion drawn by the Committee seems fair. The numbers show areas in UP that are said to be reserved and which have a higher population of Muslims than SCs, and clearly show that other general areas have a high number of SCs and a low number of Muslims. This evidence has been criticized for being weak because there are few cases and that these cases may not be representative. This is an important criticism, since the data that it presented includes only 8 reserved and 9 general areas in UP (and 9 reserved and general areas from Bihar and 10 reserved and general areas from West Bengal). In addition, however, the numbers are both wrong and misleading. The first problem is that the data presented is for administrative blocks, not for constituencies. In other words, the numbers in the first row of the table represent data for three assembly constituencies, of which only one is reserved. This problem applies not only to Hapur, but to the other cases that are presented too, since there is hardly ever a perfect overlap between political constituencies and administrative blocks in India.
9Which after Uttaranchal became an independent state became constituencies 375, 376, 382.
The second problem with the data is that it is from the 2001 census of India, while the Delimitation Commission, which drew these boundaries and selected these seats, worked with data from the 1971 census of India. Since there have been considerable changes in the total population, the SC population, and the religious composition in India between 1971 and 2001, the data is potentially very different from the data that was originally used to create these constituencies.
Finally, and most importantly, the cases that are shown are extreme cases that do not provide an accurate impression of the SC population or Muslim population in reserved and general constituencies in the three states. As will be shown in Figure 2 , there are places in UP, Bihar, West Bengal and other states that are reserved for SCs although they have a low SC population and a high Muslim population, but this is not the norm. In the next section I will describe how the selection of reserved seats took place in the 1970s and show that there is no evidence of bias against the Muslim community in the work of the Delimitation Commission.
The delimitation process
The boundaries of state assembly constituencies and parliamentary constituencies in India are determined by the Delimitation Commission, which is set down by the Government of India under the provisions of the Delimitation Commission Acts. When the constitution of India was drafted, the intention was that a new Delimitation would be conducted after every decennial census, in order for all constituencies to retain approximately the same population size.
Consequently, a Delimitation Commission was formed, and new constituency boundaries were drawn out, in 1952, 1963 and 1972 . However, in the 1970s it was decided to 'freeze' all political boundaries until 2001, as increasing the political representation of areas with a higher birthrate was seen as a perverse incentive to the implementation of family planning programs. Once all the constituency boundaries had been drawn out, the next step was to select seats to be reserved. According to the Delimitation Act of 1972 (GOI, 1972) , there were two selection criteria: (1) that the proportion of SCs should be high in selected constituencies and (2) that the reserved constituencies should be geographically spread out within the state. In practice this meant that states, and then districts, were 'assigned' reserved seats on the basis of the proportion of SCs in their population. For example, since 13.3 % of the population in Andhra Pradesh was SC, and since the state assembly was supposed to have 294 political seats, 13.3% of those 294 seats were to be reserved. In the same way, if a district had 13 % SCs and 6 political seats, then 11This information in this section is based on my archival work in the record room of the Election Commission in February 2011. I am grateful to the Director of Statistics Yashvir Singh for granting me access to these records. Soon after I consulted the records they were transferred to the National Archive in New Delhi, where they are now publicly available. 13 6*0.13=0.78≈1 reserved seat was assigned to that district. If a district was eligible for one reserved seat, the constituency with the highest proportion of SCs within the district was to be assigned to be reserved. If a district was eligible for more than one seat, the two constituencies with the highest proportion of SCs, which were not bordering each other and preferably not in the same block or subdivision, were supposed to be chosen to be reserved. Similarly, reservations were given to the Lok Sabha seats with the highest proportion SCs within each state that were not bordering each other and preferably not in the same Division of the state. At this stage of the delimitation it therefore seems unlikely that the Delimitation Commission could have discriminated against religious minorities in their work.
At the next step of the delimitation process, however, there was some room for political maneuvering. Each state was asked to select 5 Members of Parliament and 5 Members of the Legislative Assembly to serve as associate members of the Commission. These associated members were supposed to go through the suggested constituencies and provide local knowledge about geography and infrastructure that might make the constituencies unpractical. The Delimitation Commission also travelled to each of the states and had open public meetings where they heard the opinions of people about how the borders should be redrawn. In addition, the Commission received many letters from people trying to influence the delimitation process. Their records include minutes from these meetings and copies of these letters, and show how they treated the various suggestions.
Without doubt the most common concern that was raised was about moving the location of 
Muslims in Indian constituencies
Evidence presented in the previous section suggest that the Delimitation Commission did not take the religious composition of areas into consideration when they drew constituency boundaries or selected reserved seats. As was explained, however, such biases could have crept in through the pressures and suggestions made by local politicians. To determine whether this actually happened, we need to look at the actual numbers of Muslims in the constituencies that were created in the 1970s. The best source for this information is the 1971 census of India, since this was the data consulted by the Delimitation Commission, politicians and others at the time of the drafting of the delimitation.
There were two major challenges to working with the 1971 census data. First, the data were not electronically available. Second, the geographical units of the census are different from political constituencies. The first problem was solved by entering the data for the religious composition for each block in the 15 largest Indian states.
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The second problem was solved by creating estimates for the religious composition of constituencies based on this block level data.
Going through the 1976 Delimitation report, it is easy to identify which blocks overlapped with which constituencies. One constituency typically consisted of about 1.5 blocks, and in such cases the values for the other block. I was able to do this for 14 states.
14 Since the constituency level estimates are population-weighted estimates they might not be perfectly accurate at the constituency level, but assuming that the mistakes are uncorrelated with whether a constituency is reserved or general, the group averages for the reserved and general constituencies should be unbiased.
The resulting dataset has estimates of the religious composition of each of the 3,199 constituencies in the 14 states at the time of the 1970s delimitation. On average across the constituencies in these states, Muslims constituted 10.3% of the population.
Summary statistics for the Muslim population across the constituencies in these states are presented in Table 1 One of the concerns often raised about the representation of Muslims in India is that they are in minority in almost all constituencies and therefore cannot easily get elected. The estimates presented here confirm this concern, as they suggest that Muslims only formed the majority in of the electorate in 52 constituencies in these 14 states between 1974 and 2007 (1.6% of the 14The states included in the data are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, UP and West Bengal. Data for Orissa was excluded in this case because of issues in matching up blocks and constituencies. The merging work was done in collaboration with Dr Rikhil Bhavnani and has been described in further detail Jensenius (2013) . 17 constituencies). However, given that about 8% of Indian politicians from 1980 to 2000 were Muslims, most Muslim candidates who have won elections must have done so with the support of non-Muslim communities. 
More Muslims in reserved constituencies?
The data presented in the previous section suggest that Muslims formed a majority of the representation was unusually high compared to the SC population. As is quite apparent in these plots, there are many constituencies across India where there are more Muslims than SCs, but that is not the typical scenario in reserved constituencies, and it is not more common in reserved constituencies than in general ones.
Finally, we can return to the question of whether there were more Muslims in reserved constituencies than in non-reserved constituencies. If this was the case we should expect to see that the percentage of Muslims was higher in reserved constituencies than in non-reserved constituencies. The left plot of Figure 3 shows the distribution of the percentage of Muslims in general constituencies and constituencies reserved for SCs. In general constituencies we can see that the average value for Muslims was about 11%, while in constituencies reserved for SCs it was about 10%. In other words, there were on average fewer Muslims in reserved constituencies than in general constituencies, and these differences are statistically significant from 0 (p<0.01 in a Welch two-sample t-test).
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This finding is not surprising given that constituencies reserved for SCs were selected because they had a higher percentage of SCs than other constituencies. If there were more SCs in these constituencies then by construction there were fewer others. It might therefore be more interesting to look at the percentage of Muslims among the non-SCs in the population in these constituencies. The right plot in Figure 3 shows the percentage of Muslims among the non-SCs in general and reserved constituencies. In this case we see that Muslims constituted 12.7% of the population in general constituencies and 13.3% in constituencies reserved for SCs. This difference of 0.6 percentage points is not statistically significant.
15In constituencies reserved for STs, the proportion Muslims is much lower than in both genera constituencies and constituencies reserved for SCs. This is probably because ST seats are not spread out geographically, but are assigned to areas with a very high proportion STs. This is not really possible to do in the case of SCs, since SCs are much more spread out across the country than STs. 20 Table 2 presents the results from the matching analysis. The first column shows the percentage of Muslims and SCs in the full data, the second column presents the data for the matched cases. Here we see that there is still an average difference of 3.6 percentage points in the percentage of SCs in the constituencies, since the constituency with the highest proportion of SCs 16An exact match on state and district and a closest neighbor match on percentage of SC in the constituency, without replacement, was done using the package Matching in the R programming environment. Since the reserved constituencies were selected on the basis of percentage of SCs within each district, matching constituencies in this way should make the matched constituencies very similar on other characteristics too. I checked the balance for these matched constituencies on a range of other variables available in the primary census abstract, such as the literacy rate in the constituency, the percent STs, the percent workers and so on and found that they were indeed very comparable. None of these other variables came out as statistically significantly different in a t-test or a KS-test. For a more extensive discussion of matching constituencies, see Jensenius (2013) . 23 sometimes has a much higher percentage of SCs than the constituency with the second-highest proportion of SCs. These pairs are still much more comparable than the whole sample, and here we see that the percentage of Muslims is only about 0.25 percentage points lower in reserved constituencies than in general constituencies, but this difference is not statistically significant (pvalue of 0.39 in a paired t-test).
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In the third column I present a matching model where the matches were restricted to being at most 0.5 percentage points apart. This means that if the general constituency that was paired up with a reserved constituency had an SC population that was more than 0.5 percentage points smaller than the reserved constituency, then this pair was discarded from the analysis. 
Conclusion
Muslims have been under-represented in Indian politics since independence. In the Sachar
Committee report from 2006, evidence was provided that a number of constituencies reserved for Scheduled Castes (SCs) have a high proportion of Muslims and a low proportion of SCs. This 17A two-sample t-test is used when looking at the full data, but on the matched data I use a paired t-test since we can assume the same variance in the two groups after they have been matched up. 18Here I used a caliper on the variable for percentage of SC, so that matched pairs could be at most 0.5 percentage points apart on that variable. 24 It is true that the Muslims population is sometimes larger than the SC population in reserved constituencies, but that is the result of Muslims being more numerous than SCs in many constituencies across India. The SC reservations have been designed in such a way that SCs are usually a minority in reserved constituencies, and the majority of people living in reserved constituencies will therefore be unable to run for election. Sometimes Muslims form a large part 25 of those other people, and this does affect the Muslims from that constituency politically, since the competition is blocked off for only SC candidates. This is one of the disadvantages of reserved seats: some people are guaranteed representation at the cost of others. However, as I have shown in this paper, the SC reservations have not affected the Muslim community any more or less than other non-SC communities. In the case of Muslims it might seem more unfair to lose the opportunity to compete from a constituency with a large co-religious community since
Muslims have been politically under-represented in India, but the current Indian electoral system is not based on an assumption of ethnic voting. Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to how to design quotas that help some without seeming unfair to others.
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The only good solution to improving the representation of all groups in India is to either change the electoral system to a more proportional design or to reduce social divisions and biases enough for candidates from all groups to become competitive without the help of institutional safeguards.
